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The promotion of ‘good governance’ has been an important focus and key ingredient in
developing efforts for African governments and the donor community since the early
1990s. While the first and second generations of economic reforms emphasized
stabilization and structural adjustment, in order for markets to play a greater role in the
economies, the current emphasis on governance issues is an admission that the nature of
domestic institutions also matters for outcomes. For Africa as a whole, more than a decade
of economic reforms had produced only scattered examples of renewed growth and
optimism. But even in countries where growth had resumed, the continued weakness of
institutions, marked by civil strife and the absence of political pluralism, put the
sustainability of the recovery into question. Increasingly, good governance, also implying
participatory and inclusive politics, has been identified as the missing ingredient in the
reform efforts undertaken thus far.
The focus on governance has also highlighted the broad ranging obligations of
governments to their constituencies, hitherto overshadowed by the economic crisis
management role that governments have had to play in recent years. These include the
establishment and maintenance of law and order, creating transparent administrative
structures, extending social infrastructure to the rural areas, protecting poor and vulnerable
groups and including them in the decision making process, and the preservation of the
peace. The complex informational and financial demands of globalization also dictate that
African countries strive after more efficient and transparent governments.
This paper reviews the issue of governance in the context of Africa’s recent experience
with economic and political reforms. The point of departure is that good governance is a
pre-requisite for sustainable development in Africa. Growth and development require a
predictable regulatory framework, an effective and transparent public administration, and
an independent judiciary, where civilian and business disputes and other legal issues can be
resolved and court cases brought to closure. Apart from ensuring the development of a
growth-supporting economic and political environment, the above elements are also
necessary for securing the legitimacy of the state. However, while it is important for the
state to strive to recreate a growth and development enhancing environment, it should be
realised that the attainment of good governance is a process, which cannot be obtained by
the stroke of the pen as, for example, adjustments in the exchange rate.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two presents a conceptual framework for analysing
good governance. Section three provides a brief historical background to Africa's
governance problems, linking it to the growth challenge of more recent decades. Section
four discusses the policy implications of good governance and the constraints facing
African governments in attempting to achieve it. The paper is concluded in section five.
2. Conceptual issues
Governance can be defined as the science of government behaviour and performance,
including the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a
country's affairs at all levels (UNDP, 1997; Dethier, 1999). It provides the framework2
through which citizens and groups exercise their rights, meet their obligations and
articulate their interests. But while governance systems of various types have been
elucidated at various periods in the past, the recent emphasis on governance as an essential
ingredient of Africa’s reform process is unique in that it was initiated by donors and not by
domestic leaders under pressure from their constituencies (Doornbos, 2001).1 The first
extensive discussion of the link between economic performance and governance was
undertaken by the World Bank (1989) in its report on economic crisis and growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa, at the end of the 1980s. The report marked a turning point, from an almost
exclusive concern with issues of economic structure and market behaviour to those of
reforming public administrations, giving voice to the population and enhancing the
credibility of governments.
As a policy framework, ‘good governance’ imposes demands on policymakers in their
exercise of power. It encompasses (see also Hamdok, 2000; Hamdok and Kifle, 2000):
(i) An effective state i.e. one that possesses an enabling political and legal environment
for economic growth and equitable distribution.
(ii) Civil societies and communities that are represented in the policymaking process,
with the state facilitating political and social interaction, and fostering societal
cohesion and stability.
(iii) A private sector that is allowed to play an independent and productive role in the
economy.
All the three elements, singularly and in combination, together with sound economic
management, are essential for sustained development as emphasized in recent assessments
by the African Development Bank (1993, 1998, 1999a,b). However, while ‘good
governance’ is an attractive concept, it also implies value judgements that might shift been
communities and countries. To achieve many of the precepts of good governance, such as
increased public sector efficiency or reduced poverty, necessarily implies a loss to some
groups. For example, increased efficiency in public service delivery implies that the
activities of rentseekers have to be minimized. On the other hand, reducing poverty might
call for income redistribution measures, which could hurt the interests of richer groups.
Good governance can thus not be achieved in a vacuum and is the product of a bargaining
process between the various interest groups in the country. The underlying assumption is
that the will of the majority, as expressed via electoral process based on pluralist political
systems, for example, is cardinal (Mello and Barenstein, 2001).
Good governance presupposes the existence of effective domestic institutions. While the
latter are generally few, those that exist are bound to address complex agency problems.
What makes government institutions particularly complex is the hierarchical nature of the
political power structures, each level being at once a principal and an agent. For example,
while line ministries at the centre are principals for local governments they also are agents
of the cabinet, which in turn is an agent of the prime minister or president. The government
1 The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID, 2000:2) has, for example, listed seven key
capabilities, which governments in developing countries need to develop in order to meet the International
Development Targets, which revolve around the eradication of poverty. These touch on many of the
governance issues discussed in this paper, including inclusive politics and political and financial
accountability.3
as a whole has parliament as its principal, at least in representative democracies. Implied is
that the people have the ultimate authority in the political process.
Such power structures as presented above would pose few problems if the various
relationships between agents and principals were governed by complete contracts. That is
contracts made on the basis of perfect information. At each level in the bureaucracy agents
would do exactly as prescribed in the contract. However, in the real world contracts are
incomplete because information is imperfect and agents have discretionary power. At each
level, agents will have information that they do not share with the layer above them in the
hierarchy. Principals cannot be sure that once reached contracts will be honoured. They
face a moral hazard problem as a result.
In a review of governance issues, Dethier (1999: 6) notes that good development policy
involves the design of appropriate incentive schemes and institutions such that agents can
pre-commit to good behaviour. Without this, agents will continue to maximise their own
utility or that of interest groups to which they belong. In this latter case, public
administrations at the various levels will run the risk of being captured by those interest
groups. In light of these problems, principals are forced to design incentive-compatible
contracts that reduce the gap between expected output and the effort expended by the
agents.
In this regard, four interrelated approaches could help reduce conflicts between principals
and agents that arise from the information asymmetries highlighted above (Bardhan, 1997;
Singh, 1999). First, governments should be able to commit with credibility. Good
governance is thus closely related to the credibility that governments can establish with
their populations. For example, a government with a reputation for corruption will find it
difficult to convince the population that the policies that it is advocating, however good
they might appear to be, will in fact be implemented. The low credibility of the
government thus exerts high costs of implementation. Failure then becomes self-fulfilling
as resistance to the new policies forces the government to abandon them, only to try to
implement the same policies in a different guise (see Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa,
2000). To gain reputation, governments sometimes need to break away entirely from past
practices, as for examples when a new government comes to power after an election (as in
Nigeria and Senegal) or the guerrilla side wins a civil war (as in Ethiopia, Uganda and
Rwanda). Governments might also improve their reputations and gain credibility by
agreeing to regional arrangements, which imply the ceding of some sovereignty to a
regional authority, as often in the case of currency arrangements or trade policies. Such
arrangements tie the hands of the government, enabling the populations to infer that there
will be no policy shift in the future. The earlier fear of a policy shift thus dissipates and the
government is able to raise its credibility with the public.
Second, administrative systems should be accountable. In recent years, accountability,
domestically to programme beneficiaries and other stakeholders and externally to donors
with respect to their financial support, has come to comprise a key element of aid
conditionality. Donors believe that accountability increases public sector credibility,
especially in the implementation of programmes. Governments have sought to enhance
institutional accountability by increasing administrative transparency. Proffering
institutional autonomy on key institutions such as the judiciary, the central bank and the
revenue collection agencies has been important in attempts to raise public sector
accountability. Accountability also calls for legal and institutional structures to ensure that4
proper accounting procedures are maintained and verifiable standards are set (Collier,
1999).
Third, the political and economic environment should minimize risk, thereby elongating
the time horizon of the economic actors. One of the most important tasks of the
government is thus the provision of a stable and orderly macroeconomic environment. This
enables economic actors to invest long-term, which is crucial for economic development.
However, markets in many African countries are distorted or due to earlier regulations do
not yet exit. There is clearly a need for an effective regulatory framework since the recent
opening up of the economies has led to various monopolies. Along with the creation of
effective regulation, governments should make every effort to improve the efficiency with
which they provide public services, including education, communications and security
Fourth, it is important that domestic politics encompass most interest groups and that the
political system is open to contestation. Ultimately, domestic politics will dictate the speed
with which countries can move towards more transparency and increased accountability.
While the donor community has encouraged African countries to adopt more pluralistic
systems of government, they also acknowledge that sustainable political systems can only
be achieved over a long period of learning by doing. Still, few political systems, which
ignored political participation, were able to deliver ‘development’. It is important to point
out, however, that involvement in public affairs need not be confined to elections or to
membership in political parties. It can also take the form of engagement in voluntary
organizations. For many of these civil society activities to take place unhindered,
governments need to minimize the risk of conflict.
3. How governance came on the agenda
At the end of the 1980s, after close to a decade of structural adjustment, and with many
African countries in economic distress and deep indebtedness, the governance debate
began to feature in policy statements. In her paper on the role of government in economic
development, Irma Adelman (1999) has traced the debate on the role of the government in
economic development from after the Second World War. In the post-war era of
reconstruction, the role of the government was never ambiguous. The state was widely
seen as the prime mover. In response to the problems of investment lumpiness, poor
infrastructure provision and missing markets, government intervention would ensure that
that resources were moved from low to high productivity sectors, also known as the
commanding heights of the economy, thereby leading to rapid growth.2
There are three explanations for the rise of governance to the top of Africa’s political
agenda in the 1990s. The first impulse came from within Africa itself. Over three decades
after the attainment of independence, many of the hopes that had characterized the 1960s
had not been realised. Authoritarian regimes had become the order of the day, while very
little development had taken place. The ‘strongman’ tactics that many leaders believed
would ensure national unity had in many cases led to economic decline, fractionalization
2 Adelman (1999: 1) states that it was argued in the post war years that ‘…uncoordinated investments would
not permit the realisation of the inherent increasing returns to scale … Hence the need for government action
to propel the economy from uncoordinated, low-income, no-long-run-growth static equilibrium to the co-
ordinated, high-income, dynamic equilibrium, golden-growth path.’5
and civil war. Many African countries saw peasants withdrawing from the modern, market,
economy and returning to subsistence. There was growing recognition that weaknesses in
governance were limiting the payoffs to economic reform (Anyang’ Nyong’o 1997, 1999).
Second, the cold war that characterized the era after WWII came to an end with the fall of
the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet bloc.
Advocates of soviet-type regimes in Africa suddenly lost a strong moral and material
backer.
The third reason relates closely to the first two, as a result of which African leaders ran out
of easy options for funding their development programmes and armies. As a result of the
diminished geopolitical competition between the West and East, mentioned earlier, donors
were less inclined to support ‘trusted allies’ irrespective of their governance record. As a
group, the donor community conditioned its lending to improvements in governance, that
is to reduction in corruption and to increased domestic political participation. Donors have
only been willing to support countries that were demonstrating movement towards more
democratic rule, explaining the recent interplay between economic reforms and political
liberalization.
The role of donors in the debate and implementation of governance is often contradictory,
however (Bräutigam, 2000; Therkildsen, 2001). While donor governments reached the
conclusion that project based aid is injurious to the domestic bureaucratic process. The
alternative of sector-based aid or budget support is yet to take firm root. Much effort still
goes towards implementing projects in which domestic governments have little input
(DFID, 2000). This is probably a reflection of the political constraints on donor agencies
back home. Voters in donor countries still need to know what impact their aid is having in
the recipient countries. On their own, outcomes from budgetary support can not be
differentiated by donor input. Even more serious for domestic capacity development is the
tendency, marked in the early 1990s, for donors to ‘bypass’ government in disbursing
resources to projects. However, in countries where efforts to improve accountability have
been made, donors have been willing to support central budgets directly and to undertake
ex post evaluations of their own afterwards.3
While African countries have responded variously to domestic and external demands for
increased governance, a number of key features have emerged in the past decade to
indicate a commonality of experience. With respect to African responses, they can be
divided into three categories. The first comprises a limited group of countries that quickly
embarked on economic liberalization, but which now need to undertake deeper reforms,
including public sector reforms as well as political reforms, to remain on track. Since the
early 1990s, many African countries have held multiparty elections, with average voter
turnout exceeding 76 percent (Chege, 1999). In many of these, the incumbent regimes have
been defeated, while in others the opposition parties have increased their representation in
parliament. This marks a sharp departure from past practice where incumbent regimes
typically never lost elections and military coups and assassinations were the only means of
changing leadership.
3 For example, British DFID supports Rwanda’s education sector directly via the budget, with the audit done
afterwards by the Crown Agents (see Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, forthcoming).6
The second group comprises countries, which might have embarked on economic reforms,
but with little progress made in the area of governance. In this case, the government finds it
difficult to establish a solid domestic coalition for improved governance. The third group
comprises countries where little or no progress has been made. Governments are distracted
by other concerns such as civil war, with the state machinery all but broken. In this case,
the re-establishment of peace and law and order precedes governance issues.
Globalization is another source of pressure on African governments to improve their
governance image. With developing countries competing with each other for international
investment, experience has shown that funds tend to flow to countries which already have
an economic environment that is considered conducive by domestic entrepreneurs. For
example, an economic environment riddled with corruption and characterized by a history
of capital flight, due to poor economic policies and controls, will not be attractive to
foreign investors. Concerns here include the management of intellectual property rights,
investor protection, and the setting of labour and environmental standards. Related to
globalization is also the issue of neighbouring or contagion effects. The experience of
Africa’s Great Lakes region has demonstrated that adverse events in one country tend to
affect the investment patterns and general economic performance of its neighbours.
Since many African countries are similarly vulnerable, it might be necessary to set up
organizations to ensure and preserve regional governance. National attempts at improving
governance will then stop swinging to the whims of the government and the reaction of
neighbours. Recently, African leaders have been engaged in efforts to co-ordinate
development efforts, but outside the strictures of formal organization. Thus the annually
held Smart Partnerships meetings of leaders, organised by developing countries to discuss
business issues, now attract a number of African leaders. In 2001, a number of countries
belonging to the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) created an
agency (Africa Trade Insurance Agency) to insure firms against political risk. Important to
note is that the sums paid out by the insurance agency to cover injury from political
disturbances will in turn be reimbursed by the country where it happens. Thus countries
will be penalised for being risky political environments and there will be an incentive to
lower that risk.
4. Governance and policy in Africa: a cross section of experiences
While the beginning of the 1990s witnessed a positive turnaround in Africa’s economic
performance with positive spill-over effects on the region’s politics, by the end of the
decade the bulk of the economic gains had been reversed. A combination of poor weather,
external shocks and civil wars had not only reduced growth in the bulk of African
countries, but declining total investments also indicated that growth would remain low in
the medium term. However, in spite of the growth setback, the movement towards
pluralistic systems of government in many African countries has continued, although the
degree of political commitment has varied from country to country (see Freedom House,
various issues; Gelb, 1999; Levy, 1999; World Bank, 1997).
The major political change in Africa in the 1990s was the reintroduction of multiparty
systems of government. This included the holding of multiparty elections, adoption of new
pluralist constitutions and the legalization of opposition party activities. It is noteworthy
that the changes have not been confined to particular regions of Africa. Multiparty7
elections have been held in Benin, Ghana, Mali and Senegal in West Africa and in
Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia in Eastern and Southern
Africa. The latter group of countries has held at least two rounds of multiparty elections in
the past decade. In many other countries, there have been significant improvements in the
rule of law and civil liberties have been steadily gaining ground.
However, a close look at the experience of individual countries indicates a diversity of
experience. Botswana and Mauritius have demonstrated, for example, a capacity to build
effective institutions on the basis of democracy and the rule of law. Although the Botswana
Democratic Party has dominated the country’s politics since independence in 1965, wide
political latitude has been given to the opposition. Mauritius has demonstrated, on the other
hand, that ethnic heterogeneity need not lead to divisive politics and conflict. It has been
possible to include Hindus, Muslims, Creoles, Africans, and Europeans into the political
process and thus to defy the view that ethnolinguistic diversity leads to fractionalization
and lowers development potential. This has been achieved first through the holding of
regular multiparty elections, where political competition cuts across the ethnic divide.
Second, the country’s constitution ensures a balance of ethnic representation in the top
levels of government, regardless of the victorious party. Similarly, political tolerance and
inclusive politics have characterized South Africa’s transition since 1994, when the black
majority assumed power (Chege, 1999).
Evidence from elsewhere in Africa overwhelms the few democratic achievements listed
above, however. In the course of the 1990s, many states and regions in Africa seemed to
disintegrate into civil war and collapse of the rule of law. These cases are also well
represented in all regions of the continent. In Somalia, the clan rivalries following the
overthrow of the government in the early 1990s brought the country to the verge of
implosion. Liberia, on the other hand, experienced close to a decade of civil war (1989-97),
which seriously destabilised many neighbouring countries, notably Guinea-Bissau and
Sierra-Leone. Since 1992, the latter has undergone a bitter civil war, whose effects have
spilled over its borders into neighbouring countries. Civil wars have raged in other areas of
Africa as well, confining the space for institution building and introduction of the rule of
law. Though potentially rich countries, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) have been severely affected by civil war, in the former case ranging for a quarter of
a century. Populations have been displaced and, especially in the case of the DRC, the spill
over into the politics of neighbouring countries has been large and negative. The problems
of the DRC can in turn be traced to the genocide in Rwanda and the civil war in Burundi.
The problems of the Great Lakes Region demonstrate clearly how interdependent countries
in the region have become. A concept of regional governance that would ensure a more
uniform code of government behaviour could be a useful tool in the search for peace in the
region.
Why have African countries, even those which were not directly affected by civil war, such
as Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia, failed to generate sufficient
growth and to strengthen institutions in the past decade? While in many countries the poor
performance was blamed on adverse weather patterns and international commodity price
shocks, there is little doubt that domestic factors such as declining levels of efficiency in
the civil service, corruption and the politics of exclusion share some of the blame.
In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, the government resisted adjustment for far too long, partly in
deference to its ageing President who had been the architect of the earlier prosperity. For a8
commodity exporting country, the maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate was the
equivalent of a punitive tax on the countryside. For a long time, the government was able
to fund its programmes thanks to commercial loans and to some support from the
multilateral institutions. However, by the end of the 1980s, there were increasing signs that
poverty was becoming a serious problem, notably in the urban areas. In the countryside,
peasants were restive, accusing immigrants of taking their land. There were also increasing
demands for multiparty political activity. In retrospect, Ivorian policymakers adjusted
slowly to domestic demands for democracy. They also failed to perceive the threats
inherent in the failure to address the increasing poverty. Indeed the coup d’etat of
December 1999 and associated social disturbances emanated directly from the sharp
decline of the economy and the uneven nature of the recovery when adjustment policies
were embarked on in the mid 1990s. The government’s failure to promote more inclusive
politics added to the social disruption as well.
Kenya and Zimbabwe shared Côte d’Ivoire’s capitalist oriented economic structure, with
substantial foreign investments. The three countries had a relatively high level of income
inequality, partly thanks to the presence of settlers and other groups that operated estates
that contrasted sharply in productivity with the smaller peasant holdings. In both Kenya
and Zimbabwe, an entrenched leadership was for a long time reluctant to cede power to
younger leaders or opposition groups. Economic reforms became politically difficult to
implement, especially when the donor community linked them to democratic reforms.
Countries experienced an off and on relationship with donors, with financial support
becoming intermittent as well.
Of countries that earlier had professed a socialist approach to development, Ethiopia,
Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia provide interesting contrasts. Tanzania and Zambia
are neighbouring countries, which experimented with ‘African socialism’ from the 1960s,
and have so far been spared serious social cleavages. However, decades of government
control of the economy led to sharp decline in economic performance. In both countries
governments nationalized private companies and subsidies became a key element of
government control. This commandist approach to development policy was also evident in
politics, where leaders favoured single parties, which exercised influence on all facets of
economic life. When the multiparty era was introduced, the opposition party in Zambia
won the elections in the early 1990s and it embarked on policies that were lauded as
launching good governance in Africa. There was emphasis on human rights, inclusive
politics and a free press. The powers of the presidency were also to be curtailed. Few of
these promises were realised. Zambia’s experience provides a good example of how
difficult it can be to transform the political and thus governance culture of countries. In
Zambia an added difficulty was that the bulk of the ‘new’ political leaders had merely
switched sides from the previous establishment. As Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (2000)
have argued in an analysis of the political economy of reform failure in Zambia, policy
statements mean little in countries where the administrative and political elite can see few
benefits in altering their ways. Tanzania, on the other hand, adopted a more gradualist
approach to political reform. A decade after introducing multiparty elections, the political
structures are becoming more responsive to the needs of the population, without the
country experiencing the fractious politics of its neighbours.
Ethiopia and Mozambique experienced fully-fledged civil wars, which eventually ended,
but not before seriously damaging the infrastructure and weakening society at all levels. In
the 1990s, both countries embarked on the duo task of economic adjustment and9
reconstruction. The nature of the earlier armed struggles dictated that while the economic
policies would be similar, the political configurations and outcomes would be radically
different. With respect to economic reforms, including some of the more drastic ones
related to privatization and retrenchment, the two countries implemented them at a faster
pace than their neighbours. The extent of the economic decline in Ethiopia and
Mozambique was probably such that policies that promised aid inflows and economic
recovery were more effective there than in countries which had not experienced civil war.
In politics, the approaches differed markedly. In Ethiopia, the war had ended in victory for
the guerrillas, while in Mozambique the government reached a negotiated agreement with
its opponents. Mozambique opted for a multiparty form of government with parties free to
recruit supporters and to engage in active politics, while Ethiopia settled for a policy,
which potentially allowed self-determination for the various nationalities, but without
embracing competitive politics. In subsequent years, both countries have attracted a
considerable amount of donor support, and their growth rates have been above the African
average in the 1990s. Still, Ethiopia was once again engulfed in a bitter war, this time with
Eritrea, while Mozambique has been able to undertake a process of national reconciliation
and averted the risk of descent into civil war.
In the early 1960s, Rwanda and Somalia were counted among African countries most
likely to succeed. They had, at least on the face of it, a homogeneous population, sharing a
common language and with no serious religious cleavages. However, they were the only
two countries in Africa that imploded.4 Again the root causes of their instability differed,
as well as the pace of their reconstruction. In Rwanda, five years after the genocide of
1994, the government had returned the country to normalcy, with many state institutions
including the parliament functioning once again. In Somalia, parts of the country have
declared independence unilaterally, while the portion of the country that includes the
capital is under a transitional government that has promised to re-unite the country. With
the state broken up into bits in Somalia, the issues of accountability and governance have
been clearly superseded by those of national unity. Still, it is important for the Somali
leaders to assure their subjects that the structures they are trying to put in place are credible
and can elicit the support of the international community.
5. Policy discussion and conclusion
A number of lessons derive from this overview of the governance challenge in Africa.
First, political leaders have been forced by domestic circumstances and external donor
pressure to rethink the role of the state and that of its support structures in development.
Redefining the role of the state demands the creation of domestic institutions, including the
public sector that are facilitators and not impediments to growth. Since many policies and
decisions in government are taken or implemented by bureaucrats, they must have the
necessary training and skills to do so. Thus creation of the enabling environment for
growth and development entails the attraction of high calibre workers to the public sector
and putting in place facilities for training and skills upgrading. However, the government
also needs to restructure the bureaucracy, including its size, not only to contain costs but
also to enable the government to pay meaningful wages to those remaining behind.
4 It is possible to include Liberia and Sierra Leone, although the two countries never quite reached total
collapse.10
Second, proper financial management lies at the centre of good governance and
accountability. However, in many African countries financial controls within the public
sector have been weak, leading to serious abuse and outright corruption. The
modernization of the financial system is thus crucial, especially in light of the
decentralization efforts currently under way in many African countries. Even here, there is
need to raise the technical capacities for budgeting and financial analysis in the public
sector.
Third, governments will never be able to meet all society’s social and development needs.
It is thus necessary to encourage the participation of civil society in the formulation of
policies. This, in turn, demands the decentralization of power, to increase proximity to
policymakers and to make it possible for citizens to monitor the performance of local
leaders. However, mere proximity is not enough to ensure that citizens will be empowered
at the local level. They need to be encouraged to participate in decisions that affect them.
Decentralization and local empowerment have been identified as key ingredients in any
strategy that seeks to promote participation, good governance and accountability. However,
it demands financial and human resources at the local level, along with the power to local
leaders to manage and allocate them on the basis of local decisions and needs. The centre’s
partiality for control cannot be eradicated via legislation alone, however. Local
governments need to raise their legitimacy by being more efficient at dealing with local
issues and at prioritising development needs.
Fourth, the role of the public sector is bound to change with the main tasks being to
enforce policies, ensure that markets function properly, and to undertake requisite
regulatory measures. The private sector should also be supportive of private sector
activities and not be an impediment, as so often in the past. To make the public sector more
efficient, governments have created independent agencies that manage key tasks such as
tax collection, regulation of key sectors such as communications, and the management of
monetary policy or investment promotion. These agencies are allowed to determine their
own wage structures and other incentives. However, while service delivery increases as a
result, there has been a tendency for the positive effects to level off, often necessitating the
‘unclogging’ of the systems by laying off workers and employing new ones. ‘Atomization’
might thus not necessarily be the solution to the problem of low productivity and poor
accountability in the public service. It will also be necessary to undertake more holistic
measures in order to raise productivity in the rest of the public sector.
Fifth, governance is part and parcel of the political process. Good governance cannot be
sustained in an environment that is characterized by exclusive politics. In many African
countries the opening up of the political space, including the introduction of multiparty
politics and allowing a free press to operate, has raised the level of political accountability,
as well as political competition. However, the success achieved falls far short of the hopes
raised in the early 1990s, when the process began. The behaviour of the political elite has
not changed by much.11
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